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and NBERINTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a growing concern with the fragility of the
international financial system. The stock market crash in October 1987was a
world-wide phenomenon that created fears of a major financial collapse which
could severely damage the global economy. The recent collapse of the real estate
market has also been a world-wide phenomenon and has led to bankruptcies of
major real estate developers both in the United States and abroad.
Because of the rapid growth of nonperforming loans, bank failures in the
United States occurred at a record pace for the post World War II period in the
1980s and early 1990s. Unfortunately, the problems in the banking industry have
not been restricted to the United States. Norway recently experienced the near
failure of several of its banks including some of the largest, whileeven in
countries like Switzerland and Germany, banks have been running into trouble.
Regional banks in Switzerland have failed and in January 1993, BfG Bank, a
German bank needed a capital infusion from its parentcompany, Credit Lyonnais,
because it suffered a DM 1.1 billion ($700millionloss) in 1992. The collapse
of real estate values in Japan has leftmany Japanese banks with huge losses, with
the result that the Japanese government has even considered a bank bailout plan.
In September 1992, a speculative crisis in the foreign exchange market
almost brought down the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary
System. The system was saved, but only after intervention by European central
banks which is estimated to have cost them anywhere from four to six billion
dollars in foreign exchange losses. As a result, the prospects for European
monetary union have been substantially diminished.
Given these events, it is not surprising that government policymakers,
especially central bankers, have been growing more concerned about the potential
damage that an international financial crises might have on the global economy.
Several questions with regard to international financial crises have thus become of
paramount importance in recent years: What actions need to be taken to prevent
international financial crises? How can we identify financial crises that require
government intervention from other events in financial markets, although quite
dramatic, in which intervention is not needed. What principles should guide how
policymakers respond to an international financial crisis? What are the costs of2
policies designed to prevent or limit the spread of an international financial crisis?
Fortunately, the new literature on asymmetric information and financial
structure which has developed in the last twenty years can help provide answers
to these questions. In this lecture, I will outline how this literature provides a far
more precise definition of what a financial crisis is than earlier literature does.
Then with an understanding of the nature of financial crises, we cango on to
examine how policymakers might best prevent international financial crises.
WHAT IS A FINANCIAL CRISIS?
Earlier Views on Financial Crises
Up until recently, views of financial crises in the literature have split into two
polar camps, those associated with monetarists versus a more eclectic viewput
forward by Charles Kindleberger and Hyman Minsky. Monetaristsbeginning with
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have linked financial crises withbanking panics.
They stress the importance of banking panics because they view them as a major
source of contractions in the money supply which, in turn, have lead to severe
contractions in aggregate economic activity in the United States. Monetarists do
not view as real financial crises events in which, despite a sharp decline inasset
prices and a rise in business failures, there is no potential for a banking panic and
a resulting sharp decline in the money supply. Indeed, Schwartz (1986) charac-
terizes these situations as "pseudo-financial crises". Government interventionin
a pseudo-financial crisis is unnecessary and can indeed be harmful since it leads
to a decrease in economic efficiency because firms that deserveto fail are bailed
out or because it results in excessivemoney growth that stimulates inflation.
An opposite view of financial crises is outlinedby Kindleberger (1978) and
Minsky (1972) who have a much broader definition of what constitutesa real
financial crisis than monetarists. In their view, financial crises eitherinvolve
sharp declines in asset prices, failures of both large financial and nonfinancial
firms, deflations or disinflations, disruptions in foreignexchange markets, or some
combination of all of these. Since they perceiveany of these disturbances as
having potential serious consequences for the aggregateeconomy, they advocate3
a much expanded role for government intervention when a financial crisis, broadly
defined, occurs.
One problem with the Kindleberger-Minsky view of financial crises is that
it does not supply a rigorous theory of what characterizes a financial crisis, and
it thus lends itself to being used too broadly as a justification forgovernment
interventions that might not be beneficial for theeconomy. Indeed, this is the
basis of Schwartz's (1986) attack on the Kindleberger-Minsky view. On the other
hand, the monetarist view of financial crises is extremely narrow because it only
focuses on bank panics and their affect on the money supply.
Asymmetric Information and Financial Markets
The recent literature on asymmetric information and financial markets, which has
been excellently surveyed recently by Gertler (1988a), on the other hand does
provide a broader view of the nature of financial crises. However it supplies a
theory which does not automatically justify government interventions when there
is a sharp change in asset prices as the Kindleberger-Minsky view might.
Transactions that take place in financial markets are subject to asymmetric
information in which one party often does not know all that he or she needs to
know about the other party to make correct decisions. For example, a borrower
who takes out a loan usually has better information about the potential returns and
risk associated with the investment projects he plans to undertake than does the
lender. Asymmetric information creates problems in the financial system in two
basic ways: before the transaction is entered into (adverse selection) and after the
transaction is entered into (moral hazard).
Adverse selection in financial markets occurs when the potential borrowers
who are the most likely to produce an undesirable (adverse) outcome --thebad
credit risks --arethe ones most likely to be selected. Since adverse selection
makes it more likely that loans might be made to bad credit risks, lendersmay
decide not to make any loans even though there are good credit risks in the
marketplace. This outcome is a feature of the classic "lemons problem" analysis
first described by Akerlof (1970). As pointed out by Myers and Majluf (1984)4
and Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984), a lemonsproblem occurs in the debt
and equity markets when lenders have troubledetermining whether a lender is a
good risk (he has good investment opportunities with low risk)or, alternatively,
is a bad risk (he has poorer investment projects withhigh risk). In this situation,
a lender will only be willing to pay a price for a security that reflects theaverage
quality of firms issuing the securities --aprice below fair market value (the net
present value of the expected income streams) for high-quality firms, but above
fair market value for low-quality firms. Theowners or managers of a high-
quality firm that know their quality then also know that their securitiesare
undervalued and will not want to sell them in the market. On theother hand, the
firms willing to sell their securities will below-quality firms because they know
that the price of their securities isgreater than their value. Since asymmetric
information prevents investors from determining whethersome firms are high
quality, these high quality firms will issue few securities and credit marketswill
not work well since many projects with a positive netpresent value will not be
undertaken.
Moral hazard in financial markets occurs aftera loan is extended when the
lender is subjected to the hazard that the borrowermight engage in activities that
are undesirable (immoral) from the lender's point of view, becausethey increase
the probability of default. Moral hazard arisesas a result of asymmetric informa-
tion since the lender's lack of knowledge about theborrower's activities enables
the borrower to engage in moral hazard.However, asymmetric information is not
the only source of the moral hazardproblem. Moral hazard can also occur
because high enforcement costs might make ittoo costly for the lender to prevent
moral hazard even when the lender isfully informed about the borrower's activi-
ties.
Moral hazard occurs because the borrower hasincentives to invest in
projects with high risk in which the borrower does well if theproject succeeds but
the lender bears most of the loss if theproject fails. Also the borrower has incen-
tives to misallocate funds for hisown personal use, to shirk and just not workvery
hard, or to undertake investment in unprofitableprojects that increase his power
or stature. The conflict of interest between the borrowerand lender stemming
from moral hazard (theagency problem) implies that many lenders will decide that5
theywould rather not make loans, so that lending and investment will be at
suboptimal levels.
One of the reasons that using asymmetric information theory to understand
financial crises is so attractive, is that this theory is also able to explain the basic
facts about our financial structure. Clearly, a theory that explains a widerange
of phenomena has a higher probability of being correct and this is the case for
asymmetric information theory. The basic facts about our financial structure are
as follows:
1. Issuing marketable securities is not the primary way businesses finance
their operations.
2. Only large, well-established corporations issue securities to finance their
activities.
3. The financial system is among the most heavily regulated sectors of the
economy.
4. Financial intermediation is the primary way that funds are channeled to
those with productive investment opportunities.
5.Banksare the most important source of external funds for businesses.
6. Debt contracts are used more extensively than are equity contracts.
7. Collateral is a prevalent feature of debt contracts.
8. Debt contracts are extremely complicated legal documents that place
substantial restrictions on the borrower.
Asymmetric information theory explains the first fact, why marketable
securities are not used more extensively, by pointing out that a lemons problem
exists in which low quality firms will be more eager to issue securities. Private
production and sale of information, which does occur, can help reduce the
asymmetric information that leads to the lemons problem for securities. However,
the free-rider problem described below, in which people who do notpay for
information can take advantage (free-ride off) of the information that otherspay
for, suggests that the private sale of information will only be a partial solution to
the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in securities markets.
If some investors acquire information that tells them which securities are6
undervalued and therefore buy their securities, other investors who have notpaid
for this information may be able to buy right along with the well-informed
investors. If enough free-riding investors can do this, the increased demand for
the undervalued securities will cause their low price to be bidup to reflect the
securities' full net present value given this information. As a result of all these
free riders, investors who have acquired information will no longer be ableto earn
the entire increase in the value of the security arising from this additional
information. The weakened ability of private firms to profit fromproducing
information will mean that less information is produced in securitiesmarkets, so
that the adverse selection problem might continue to bean impediment to a well-
functioning securities market. However, the free-rider problem with regard to
adverse selection may not always be that severe if those who haveacquired
information can keep their purchases of securities secretso that less free-riding
occurs.
More importantly, the free-rider problem makes it lesslikely that securities
markets will act to reduce incentives to commit moral hazard.Monitoring and
enforcement of restrictive covenants (provisions in debtcontracts that restrict and
specify certain activities of the borrower) arenecessary to reduce moral hazard.
By monitoring a borrower's activities to see whether he is complying with the
restrictive covenants and enforcing the covenants if he isnot, lenders can prevent
borrowers from taking on risk at theirexpense. However, because monitoring and
enforcement of restrictive covenants are costly, the free-riderproblem discourages
this kind of activity in securities markets. Ifsome investors know that other
securities holders are monitoring and enforcing the restrictivecovenants, then they
can free ride on the other securities holders' monitoring and enforcement. Once
these other securities holders realize thatthey can do the same thing, they also
may stop their monitoring and enforcement activities, with the result that not
enough resources are devoted to monitoring and enforcement. The outcome is that
moral hazard continues to be a severe problem for marketablesecurities.
Asymmetric information theory thus explain why securities are not theway
most businesses finance their activities. It also explains the second fact thatonly
large, well-established firms can issue securities. These firmsare the ones for
whom information is easiest to collect andso adverse selection and moral hazard7
problems are less of a hindrance to their issuing securities. Adverse selection
(lemons) and moral hazard problems also explain the third fact that government
regulation of financial markets is so pervasive. One way to reduce adverse
selection and moral hazard problems is for the government to require that firms
issuing securities supply information to the marketplace that reduces asymmetric
information.
The fourth fact that financial intermediaries are crucial to the channeling of
funds to those with productive investment opportunities is explained by the
existence of both adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial
markets. Financial intermediaries are especially suited to solving adverse selection
problems because they become experts at screening out good from bad credit risks
and monitoring borrowers to make sure that they do not engage in risky activities
that would increase the probability of default. Financial intermediaries profit from
the information they produce because they avoid the free-rider problem by making
private loans that are not traded. As a result, other investors cannot free ride off
the financial intermediary and bid up the loan's price which would prevent the
intermediary from profiting from their information production activities.
Similarly, no one else can free ride off financial intermediaries' monitoring
activities when they make private loans. Financial intermediaries thus receive the
benefits of monitoring and so are better equipped to prevent moral hazard on the
part of borrowers.
The fifth fact that banks are the most important player in channeling credit
to borrowers is explained by their advantages in making private loans as a financial
intermediary and the fact that they have particular advantages over other financial
intermediaries in solving adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Banks'
advantages in information collection activities are enhanced by their ability to
engage in long-term customer relationships and issue loans using lines of credit
arrangements. In addition their ability to scrutinize the checking account balances
of their borrowers provides them with an additional advantage in monitoring the
borrowers behavior. Banks also have advantages in reducing moral hazard
because, as demonstrated by Diamond (1984), they can engage in lower cost
monitoring than individuals, and because, as pointed out by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1983), they have advantages in preventing risk taking by borrowers since they can8
use the threat of cutting off lending in the future to improve borrower'sbehavior.
Banks' natural advantages in collecting information andreducing moral hazard
explain why banks have such an important role in financial markets.
A particular form of moral hazard, the principal-agentproblem, explains the
sixth fact why debt contracts are usedmore extensively than equity contracts.
When managers (the agj) own only a smallpercentage of the equity in a firm,
they have an incentive to commit moral hazard againstequity holders (the
principals) by either hiding profits or by engaging in activities thatincrease the
their well-being but do not benefit theequity holders. To prevent this moral
hazard from occurring equity holders have toengage in monitoring, referred to as
costly state verification. Costly state verification can be avoided if itonly occurs
in bad states of the world, as is thecase for debt contracts where this verification
only takes place when the debt contract is in default. Theadvantage of a less
frequent need to monitor the firm explainswhy debt contracts are used more
frequently than equity contracts.
The seventh fact that collateral isa prevalent feature of debt contracts is
explained by the adverse selection problem. With sufficientcollateral, a lender
can worry less about the adverse selection problem: ifa borrower is a bad credit
risk and then defaults, the lender willnot have substantial losses if there is
collateral because he can takepossession of the collateral, sell it, and thereby
offset the loss from the default. The needto minimize moral hazard explains the
eighth fact that debt contracts are typicallyextremely complicated legal documents
that place substantial restrictionson the borrower. These restrictions, called
restrictive covenants, arenecessary because they enable the Lender to prevent the
borrower from engaging in risky activities thatmake it less likely that the loan will
be paid off in full.
As this brief review of the literatureon asymmetric information and
financial structure indicates,asymmetric information theory has proved to be
extremely valuable in understanding the basic facts about financialstructure. The
success of this theory for explaining financialstructure suggests that it may also
be successful at explaining andunderstanding the facts about financial crises.9
Defining a Financial Crisis
Theasymmetric information theory outlined above provides a framework
for understanding how a disruption in financial markets can cause a downturn in
aggregate economic activity. It also provides the following more precise definition
of what a financial crisis is.
A financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which adverse
selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that
financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those who
have the most productive investment opportunities.
A financial crisis thus results in the inability of financial markets to function
efficiently, which leads to a sharp contraction in economic activity. This definition
of a financial crisis is more precise than the Kindleberger-Minsky view, but it still
so general that it does not help identify when a financial crisis is occurring or is
imminent. To identify a financial crisis, we need easily identifiable signals that
indicate whether adverse selection and moral hazard problems are worsening in
financial markets. Fortunately, asymmetric information theory does suggest what
these signals might be by suggesting what easily identifiable factors can promote
financial crises.
Factors Promoting Financial Crises
Five primary factors in the economic environment can lead to substantial
worsening of adverse selection and moral hazard in financial markets, which then
cause a financial crisis and shift the economy from an equilibrium with high output
to one with low output because the financial system is unable to channel funds to
those with the best investment opportunities. The factors causing financial crises
are: (1) increases in interest rates, (2) stock market declines, (3) increases in
uncertainty, (4) bank panics, and (5)anunanticipated decline in inflation.10
Increases in Interest Rates. As demonstrated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
asymmetric information and the resulting adverse selection problem can lead to
credit rationing in which some borrowers are denied loans even whenthey are
willing to pay a higher interest rate. This occurs because individuals and firms
with the riskiest investment projects are exactly those who are willing topay the
highest interest rates since if the high-risk investment succeeds, they will be the
main beneficiaries. Thus a higher interest rate leads to evengreater adverse
selection; that is, it increases the likelihood that the lender is lending to a bad
credit risk. If the lender cannot discriminate who are the borrowers with the
riskier investment projects, it may want to cut down the number of loans itmakes,
which causes the supply of loans to decrease with the higher interestrate rather
than increase. Thus, even if there is an excess demand for loans,a higher interest
rate will not be able to equilibrate the market because additional increases in the
interest rate will only decrease the supply of loans and make theexcess demand
for loans increase even further.'
The theory behind credit rationing can be used to show that increases in
interest rates can be one factor that helps precipitatea financial crisis, If market
interest rates are driven up sufficiently, because of increased demandfor credit or
because of a decline in themoney supply, there is a higher probability that lenders
will lend to bad credit risks, those with the riskiest investmentprojects, because
good credit risks are less likely to want to borrow while bad credit risksare still
willing to borrow. Because of the resulting increase in adverse selection, lenders
will want to make fewer loans, possibly leadingto a steep decline in lending which
will lead to a substantial decline in investment andaggregate economic activity.
Indeed, as Mankiw (1986) has demonstrated, a small rise in the riskiess interest
rate can sometimes lead to a very large decrease inlending and even a possible
collapse in the loan market.
'Jaffee and Russell (1976) have demonstrated a secondtype of credit rationing in which
lendersmake loans but limit their size to less than the borrowermay want. This occurs because
the larger the loan, the greater are moral hazard incentives for theborrower to engage in
activities that make it less likely that the loan will berepaid.11
Stock Market Declines. An important way that financial markets can solve the
problems created by asymmetric information is the use of collateral. Collateral
reduces the consequences of adverse selection or moral hazard because it reduces
the lender's losses in the case of a default. If a borrower defaults on a loan, the
lender can take title to the collateral and sell it to make up for the losses on the
loan. Thus if the collateral is of good enough quality, then the fact that there is
asymmetric information between borrower and lender is no longer as important
since the loss incurred by the lender if the loan defaults is substantially reduced.
Net worth performs a similar role to collateral since if a firm has high net
worth, then even if it defaults on its debt payments as a result of poor investments,
the lender can take title to the firm's net worth, sell it off, and use the proceeds
to recoup some of the losses from the loan. (Note that in a multi-period context,
Gertler (1988b) shows that the concept of a borrower's net worth can be
broadened to include the discounted value of future profits which is reflected in the
market value of the borrowing firm.) In addition, the more net worth a firm has
in the first place, the less likely it is to default because the firm has a cushion of
assets that it can use to pay off its loans. High net worth also directly decreases
the incentives for borrowers to commit moral hazard because they now have more
at stake, and thus more to lose, if they default on their loans. Hence, when firms
seeking credit have high net worth, the consequences of adverse selection and
moral hazard are less important and lenders will be more willing to make loans.
The importance of net worth for reducing adverse selection and moral
hazard problems provides a rationale for why stock market declines can help cause
a financial crisis. As emphasized by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988), Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), and Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), a sharp decline in the stock
market, as in a stock market crash, can increase adverse selection and moral
hazard problems in financial markets because it leads to a large decline in the
market value of firms' net worth. (Note that this decline in asset values could
either occur because of expectations of lower future income streams from these
assets or because of a rise in market interest rates which lowers the present
discounted value of future income streams.) The decline in net worth as a result
of a stock market decline makes lenders less willing to lend because, as we have
seen, the net worth of firms has a similar role to collateral, and when the value of12
collateral declines, it provides less protection to lenders so that losses from loans
are likely to be more severe. In addition, the decline in corporate net worth as a
result of a stock market decline increases moral hazard incentives for borrowing
firms to make risky investments because these firms now have less to lose if their
investments go sour. Because borrowers have increased incentives to engage in
moral hazard and because lenders are now less protected against the consequences
of adverse selection, the stock market decline leads to decreased lending and a
decline economic activity.
Increases in Uncertainty. A dramatic increase in uncertainty in financial
markets, due perhaps to the failure of a prominent financial or non-financial
institution, a recession, or a stock market crash, makes it harder for lenders to
screen out good from bad credit risks. The increase in uncertainty therefore
makes information in the financial markets even more asymmetric and makes the
adverse selection problem worse. The resulting inability of lenders to solve the
adverse selection problem, renders them less willing to lend, leading to a decline
in lending, investment and aggregate activity.
Bank Panics.As we have seen, banks have a very important role in financial
markets since they are well suited to engage in information-producing activities
that facilitate productive investment for the economy.Thus as described by
Bernanke (1983), a financial crisis which results in a bank panic, the simultaneous
failure of many banks, reduces the amount of financial intermediation undertaken
by banks, and will thus lead to a decline in investment and aggregate economic
activity.
As indicated by Gorton and Calomiris (1991), the source of a bank panic
is again asymmetric information. In a panic depositors, fearing the safety of their
deposits, withdraw them from the banking system, causing a contraction in loans
and a multiple contraction in deposits, which then causes banks to fail. Asymmet-
ric information is critical to this process because depositors rush to make
withdrawals from solvent as well as insolvent banks since they cannot distinguish
between them. Furthermore, banks' desire to protect themselves from possible13
deposit outflows leads them to increase their reserves relative to deposits, which
also produces a contraction in loans and deposits and promotes other bank failures.
The net result is that a bank panic reduces the funds available to banks to make
loans and the cost of financial intermediation rises, causing a reduction in
investment and a decline in aggregate economic activity.
A bank panic also can lead to higher interest rates because the panic results
in decreasing liquidity since the supply of funds to borrowers has been curtailed.
As we have seen, this rise in interest rates directly increases adverse selection
problems in credit markets and also can reduce the value of firms' net worth,
which also increases adverse selection as well as moral hazard problems. Thus,
since bank panics have the secondary effect of increasing adverse selection and
moral hazard problems in financial markets, bank panics lead to economic
contraction through these channels as well.
Unanticipated Decline in InflationAn unanticipated decline in inflation also
decreases the net worth of firms. Interest rate payments on debt are contractually
fixed in nominal terms and allow for expected inflation. When inflation turns out
to be less than anticipated, which can either occur because of an unanticipated
disinflation as occurred in the 1980s or by an outright deflation as frequently
occurred before World War II, the value of firms' liabilities in real terms rises so
that there is an increased burden of the debt, but there is no corresponding rise in
the real value of firms' assets. The result is that net worth in real terms declines.
A sharp unanticipated disinflation or deflation, therefore causes a substantial
decline in real net worth and an increase in adverse selection and moral hazard
problems facing lenders. The resulting increase in adverse selection and moral
hazard problems (of the same type that were discussed in assessing the effect of
stock market declines earlier) will thus also work to cause a decline in investment
and economic activity.2
2Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) emphasize this mechanism in their econometric analysis of
the 1894-1909 period. A related mechanism that would cause a decline in aggregate demand
works through an anticipated deflation which then raises real interest rates and causes a decline
in investment. Recent work by Cecchetti (1992), Hamilton (1992), and Evans and Wachtel
(1993) has focused on whether the deflation during the Great Depression was anticipated, coming14
An Additional Signal of a Financial Crisis
To identify a financial crisis, the analysis above suggests that we should look for
sharp declines in stock prices, increases in interest rates, major failures of financial
and nonfinancial institutions, bank panics and unanticipated declines in inflation.
Our analysis of the impact of asymmetric information on financial markets
suggests an additional piece of information that helps signal a financial crisis: the
spread between interest rates on low and high-quality bonds. When adverse
selection increases in financial markets during a financial crisis there should bea
large rise in interest rates to borrowers for which there is substantial difficulty in
obtaining reliable information about their characteristics, that is, for which there
is a serious asymmetric information problem. On the other hand, there would be
a much smaller effect on interest rates to borrowers for which there is almost no
asymmetric information problem because it is easy to obtain information about
their characteristics. Since low-quality borrowers aremore likely to be firms for
which information about their characteristics is difficult toobtain, while high-
quality borrowers are more likely to be ones for which the asymmetric information
problem is least severe, a rise in the spread between interest rates for low and
high-quality borrowers can provide information on when the adverse selection
problem becomes more severe in debt markets.
The spread between interest rates for low andhigh-quality borrowers can
also provide information about whether moral hazardproblems in financial markets
are increasing during a financial crisis. High-quality borrowers withinitially high
net worth are much less likely to engage in moral hazard whena stock market
crash or a deflationary shock occurs becausethey still will have sufficient net
worth so that they continue to have much to lose ifthey default on their debts. On
to somewhat mixed conclusions. It is important to recognize that the mechanism describedin the
text in which unanticipated deflation causes a decline in investmentsuggests that the distinction
between anticipated and unanticipated deflationsmay not be all that crucial in understanding why
the Great Depression occurred. Both mechanismssuggest that the sharp deflation in the 1930-3 3
period in the United States was an important factor causing the Great Depression, whether the
deflation was anticipated or not.15
the other hand, when a stock market crash or a deflationary shock occurs, low-
quality borrowers with initially low net worth will now have so little net worth left
that their incentives to commit moral hazard will be greatly increased. The
outcome is that a deflationary shock or a stock market crash which increases moral
hazard problems in debt markets should result in a greater increase in interest rates
for low-quality borrowers than for high-quality borrowers. An increase in the
interest rate spread for low versus high-quality borrowers thus suggests that moral
hazard as well as adverse selection problems are increasing in financial markets.
The Sequence of Events in Past Financial Crises
To provide evidence on whether our asymmetric information view of financial
crises, we can see whether the sequence of events in past financial crises conform
to what our theory predicts.
As documented in Mishkin (1991), most financial crises in the U.S. have
indeed begun with a sharp rise in interest rates, a stock market crash and an
increase in uncertainty arising after the start of a recession and from a failure of
major financial or non-financial firms (the Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Co. in
1857, the Northern Pacific Railroad and Jay Cooke & Co. in 1873, Grant & Ward
in 1884, the National Cordage Co. in 1893, the Knickerbocker Trust Company in
1907, and the Bank of United States in 1930.) During these crises the increase in
uncertainty, the rise in interest rates and the stock market crash increased the
severity of adverse selection problems in credit markets, while the decline in net
worth stemming from the stock market crash also increased moral hazard
problems. As the theory predicts, the spread between interest rates on low and
high-quality bonds rose when these events occurred, indicating the worsening
adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets. The increase
in adverse selection and moral hazard problems made it less attractive for lenders
to lend and led to a decline in investment and aggregate economic activity.
Because of the worsening business conditions and uncertainty about their
bank's health, depositors now began to withdraw their funds from banks because
they worried that the banks might become insolvent. The resulting bank panic, in16
which the number of banks declined, raised interest rates even further and
decreased the amount of financial intermediation by banks. With the bank panic,
the spread between interest rates on low and high quality bonds jumped even
further, indicating a further worsening of the problems created by adverse selection
and moral hazard, which, in turn, led to further economic contraction.
In many of the episodes, such as the panics of 1857, 1884, 1890, 1893, and
1907, there now would be a sorting out of insolvent firms from healthy firms by
bankruptcy proceedings and the same process would occur for banks, often with
the help of public and private authorities. Once this sorting out was complete,
uncertainty in financial markets would decline, the stock market would undergo
a recovery, and interest rates would fall. The result would then be a diminution
in adverse selection and moral hazard problems, the spread between interest rates
on low and high quality bonds would decline, and the financial crisis would
subside. With the financial markets able to operate well again, the stage would
be set for the recovery of the economy.
However, in other episodes, such as the 1873 panic and the Great
Depression, the economic downturn and contraction of the money supply resulting
from the bank panic led to a sharp decline in prices. With the unanticipated
deflation, the recovery process might get short-circuited.In this situation
described by Irving Fisher (1933) as a debt-deflation, the unanticipated deflation
led to a further deterioration in firms' net worth because of the increased burden
of indebtedness. When debt-deflation set in the adverse selection and moral hazard
problems continue to increase, so that the spread between interest rates on low and
high quality bonds keeps on rising. As a result, investment spending and
aggregate economic activity remain depressed for a long time.
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from studying the U.S.
episodes. The timing and the pattern of the data in the episodes seem to fit an
asymmetric information interpretation of financial crises.Rather than starting
with bank panics, as the monetarist view of financial crises contends, most of the
financial crises began with a rise in interest rates, a stock market crash and the
widening of the interest rate spread. Furthermore, a financial panic frequently was
immediately preceded by a major failure of a financial firm and the beginning of
the recession which increased uncertainty in the marketplace. The increase in17
uncertainty and the rise in interest rates magnified the adverse selection problem
in the credit markets, while the decline in the stock market increased adverse
selection and moral hazard problems, both of which were reflected in the rise in
the spread between interest rates for low and high-quality borrowers. The increase
in adverse selection and moral hazard problems then led to a decline in investment
activity and aggregate economic activity.
Only after these problems have manifested themselves in financial markets
do we find that a bank panic occurs. The monetarist explanation of financial crises
does not explain the timing of banking panics, that is, why they occurred when
they did. Asymmetric information analysis, on the other hand, sees bank panics
as a consequence of high interest rates, a major failure of a corporation or a
nonbank financial institution, or weak business conditions stemming from a
recession which makes depositors nervous about the health of banks that hold their
deposits. Since depositors cannot easily screen out good from bad banks, when
this adverse aggregate information appears, they worry about potential losses on
their deposits and withdraw funds from the banking system, precipitating a panic.
The facts about the crisis episodes discussed in Mishkin (1991) are thus entirely
consistent with Gorton's (1987) view that bank panics are predictable.
Once a bank panic sets in, the resulting loss of liquidity causes interest rates
to rise further, the stock market to decline even more and the adverse selection and
moral hazard to worsen, as manifested by a further widening of the spread
between interest rates for low versus high-quality borrowers. Finally, the sorting
out of solvent from insolvent firms and banks occurs, the crisis then subsides, the
stock market undergoes a recovery, interest rates fall, and if economic uncertainty
and unanticipated deflation were not too severe, adverse selection and moral
hazard problems would diminish, leading to a decline in the interest rate spread
between low and high-quality borrowers. In episodes in which a substantial
deflation does not occur we then expect and do see a rapid decline in the spread
between interest rates for low versus high-quality borrowers.
However, in episodes in which a substantial deflation sets in, we see
evidence of a debt-deflation process in which there is a prolonged continuation of
a large spread between interest rates for low and high-quality borrowers. It is
exactly in these episodes that we see aggregate economic activity depressed for a18
prolonged period of time.
Pseudo-Financial Crises
Our analysis of what constitutes a financial crisis also distinguishes between
financial crises which severely damage the economy by interfering with the smooth
functioning of financial market and other financial market disturbances which,
although very dramatic, are not damaging to the economy in themselves. Sharp
changes in asset prices, such as those occurring during a stock market crash or in
a foreign exchange crisis often are viewed as financial crises. However, the
asymmetric information view suggests that such financial disturbances may not
qualify for the financial crisis label unless they are combined with other events
which lead to the full-blown financial crisis we described in the previous section.
These financial disturbances which do not lead to increases in asymmetric
information problems in the financial markets will not seriously damage the
economy and thus qualify for Schwartz's (1986) designation as "pseudo-financial
crises".
For example, there are many instances of stock market crashes, which
show no manifestation of an increase in asymmetric information problems in
financial markets. For example, one of the most severe stock market crashes in
U.S. history occurred in May of 1940 in the aftermath of Dunkirk. Indeed, the
monthly decline in May 1940 was the third largest negative monthly return in the
1834-1988 period examined by Wilson, Sylla and Jones (1990). However, this
crash occurred at a time when the U.S. economy was booming and interest rates
were low, so that other conditions were very unfavorable to worsening of adverse
selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets. Not surprisingly, as
pointed out in Mishkin (1991), the spread between interest rates on low and high
quality bonds rose hardly at all and the U.S. economy kept on booming.
Even more striking is the behavior of the interest rate spread in Lhe
aftermath of the October 1929 stock market crash, which is viewed bymany
laymen as the cause of the Great Depression. Although there was some rise in the19
spread after the crash, for a year following it remained at remarkably low levels,
especially considering the decline in the stock market and the fall in industrial
production in this period documented by Friedman and Schwartz (1963). It was
not until the first bank panic in October 1930, that asymmetric information
problems in financial markets substantially worsened and the interest rate began
to rise, eventually to unprecedentedly high levels by 1933. Thus, consistent with
Friedman and Schwartz's view, the stock market crash was not a full-fledged
financial crisis and did not cause of the Great Depression.
The fact that the 1929 stock market crash did not lead to a deterioration in
the smooth functioning of financial markets was not happenstance. The credit for
averting a financial crisis in this episode goes to the prompt action by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to provide reserves to the New York banks. During
the panic period, banks and lenders outside of New York rushed to liquidate their
call loans to brokers. In order to keep market conditions from getting more
unsettled, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as described by its president,
George L. Harrison, kept its "discount window wide open and let it be known
that member banks might borrow freely to establish the reserve required against
the large increase in deposits resulting from the taking over of loans called by
others."3 In addition, the New York Fed made open market purchases of $160
million during this period, even though this amount was far in excess of what was
authorized by the Federal Reserve System's Open Market Investment Committee.
In the aftermath of the New York Fed's action to provide sufficient liquidity for
the economy there was a decline of the interest rate spread to levels below those
before the stock market crash and a continuing low level up until October 1930.
Armored with the asymmetric information definition of financial crises, it
also should be obvious that foreign exchange crises, which are often labeled as
international financial crises, are likely to fit into the category of a "pseudo-
financial crisis". Foreign exchange crises like the one that almost brought down
the European Monetary System in September 1992 involve a speculative attack on
currencies in a fixed exchange rate system, a key feature of which is that in effect
central banks have established a one-sided bet for speculators by standing ready
3Friedman and Schwartz (1963), page 339.20
to intervene to prop up weak currencies. In this situation private firms and banks
in the aggregate are not exposed to large losses of wealth because a change in the
exchange rate leads both to winners and losers. Furthermore, private firms and
banks actually tend to benefit during these "crises" because the one-sided
intervention on the part of central bank results in huge profits for the speculators
at the expense of the central banks. During the September 1992 exchange rate
crisis, reports in the press indicated that intervention by the central banks resulted
in their losing from 4 to 6 billion dollars.
Indeed, the only danger of financial crisis might come from central bank
attempts to prop up their domestic currency by raising interest rates to extremely
high levels, as occurred in Sweden when the interbank rate went to 500%.Ifsuch
tight money policies are continued for very long, then there is a potential for the
high interest rates to lead to increased asymmetric information problems in the
financial markets. One of the reasons that central banks often are forced to give
up on pegging the value of their currency during a speculative attack is that they
sensibly have concluded that attempts to keep the exchange rate fixed will have
costly effects on the economy.
Recent Potential Financial Crises
Since the Great Depression, severe financial crises have not been a feature
of the world economy. However, there have been several episodes in which the
potential for a severe financial crisis existed, but timely intervention by a central
bank prevented the financial crisis from occurring. Two examples in the United
States illustrate that the potential for financial crises are still substantial: the Penn
Central bankruptcy in June 1970 and the stock market crash in October 1987.
Prior to 1970, commercial paper was considered one of the safest money
market instruments because only corporations with very high credit ratings issued
it.It was common practice for corporations to continually roll over their
commercial paper, that is, issue new commercial paper to pay off the old. Penn
Central Railroad was a major issuer of commercial paper, with more than $20021
million outstanding, but by May 1970 it was on the verge of bankruptcy and it
requested federal government assistance from the Nixon administration.4 Despite
administration support for a bailout of Penn Central, after six weeks of debate
Congress decided not to pass bailout legislation.Meanwhile, the Nixon
administration asked the Board of Governors to authorize a direct loan from the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Fed to Penn Central. However, on Thursday,
June 18, the New York Fed informed the Board of Governors that its staff studies
indicated that Penn Central would not be able to repay the loan, and as a result the
Board decided not to authorize the loan. Without this loan, Penn Central was
forced to declare bankruptcy on Sunday, June 21.
Once the Federal Reserve made the decision to let Penn Central go into
bankruptcy, it was concerned that Penn Central's default on its commercial paper
would, as Brimmer (1989) puts it, have had a "chilling effect on the commercial
paper market" (p. 6), making it impossible for other corporations to roll over their
commercial paper. The Penn Central bankruptcy, then, had the potential for
sending other companies into bankruptcy which, in turn, might have triggered
further bankruptcies---leading to a full-scale financial panic. To avoid this
scenario, the New York Fed got in touch with a number of large money center
banks on Saturday and Sunday, June 20 and 21, alerted them to the impending
Penn Central bankruptcy on June 22, encouraged them to lend to their customers
who were unable to roll over their commercial paper, and indicated that the
discount window would be made available to the banks so that they could make
these loans.5 Indeed, the banks did as they were told and made these loans,
receiving as much as $575millionthrough the discount window for this purpose.
In addition, on June 22 the Fed decided to suspend Regulation Qceilingson
deposits of $100,000 and over in order to keep short-term interest rates from
rising, and the formal vote was taken the next day to allow the FDIC and the
4See Maisel (1973) and Brimmer (1989) for further discussionofthe Penn Central bankruptcy
episode.
5ftisnoteworthy that when the Fed advanced discount loans to banks lending to customers
who needed to role over their commercial paper, the banks were told that they would be
responsible for the credit risk involved in this lending. See Brimmer (1989), page 6.22
FHLBB to take parallel action. The net result was that the Federal Reserve
provided liquidity so that the commercial paper market would keep functioning.
The rationale for the Fed's action was that lenders would not be able to
screen out good borrowers in this market from bad borrowers. Was this rationale
plausible? The data in Figure 1 on the following variables suggest that it was,
The STOCK variable is the cumulative geometric sum of the stock market return
series in Wilson, Sylla and Jones (1990) and is an end-of-month series and RCP
is the 4-6 month commercial paper rate. The SPREADB variable is the spread
between Moody's Baa corporate bond rate and the long-term Treasury bond rate
averaged over the month, the same spread variable used by Bernanke (1983),
while SPREADC is the spread between interest rates on 4-6 month commercial
paper and 6-month Treasury bills. (The interest rate data were obtained from
various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.) The onset of the recession in
January 1970 is marked with an "R", and the Penn Central bankruptcy date is
marked by a 'T". Panel A contains data on the stock market variable, STOCK,
and the commercial paper rate, RCP, and Panel B contains data on the interest rate
spread variables, SPREADS and SPREADC.
The data in Panel A display the typical pattern found in pre World War II
financial crises. The high level of interest rates reached in late 1969-early 1970
and the increase in uncertainty with the onset of the recession in January 1970 are
likely to have increased the adverse selection problem in the credit markets.
Furthermore, by May 1970 the stock market had declined over 35% from its peak
value in November 1969. This decline in the valuation of firms resulted in a
decrease in net worth and further increased moral hazard and adverse selection
problems in the credit markets. Consistent with the rise in asymmetric information
difficulties for the credit markets we do see in Panel B a rise in both of the interest
rate spread variables, SPREADS (for long-term bonds) and SPREADC (for
commercial paper). Furthermore, despite the Fed's actions we also see a jump in
the interest rate spread variables at the time of the Penn Central bankruptcy in
June 1970. The fact that the spread between interest rates on corporate Baa and
Treasury bonds, rises along with the commercial paper-Treasury spread variable
indicates that the problems in the commercial paper market did have a potential for
spreading to other sectors of the capital market. As occurred in earlier episodes23
of financial crisis, the interest rate spread does decline after the crisis, and this
pattern is especially pronounced for the commercial paper-Treasury spread variable
in Panel B, which returns to 1968 levels by the end of 1970. The SPREADB
variable, on the other hand, continues to remain high for over two years after the
Penn Central bankruptcy. However, the increase in the SPREADB variable
resulting from the Penn Central bankruptcy was not large by the standards of
earlier financial crises. A major disturbance to the credit markets as a result of
increased asymmetric information problems seems to have been avoided by the
Fed's willingness to perform its lender-of-last resort function.6
The causes of the stock market crash of 1987 are still being hotly debated,
but the biggest danger to the economy appears not to have come from the decline
in wealth resulting from the crash itself, but rather from the threat to the clearing
and settlement system in the stock and futures markets.7 From the peak on
August 25, 1987 until October 16, just prior to the crash, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average had declined 17.5%. On Monday, October 19, the market fell by 22.6%
(as measured by the DJIA) on record volume of 604 million shares. Although
October 19, 1987, dubbed "Black Monday", will go down in history as the largest
one-day decline in stock prices to date, it was on Tuesday, October 20, 1987, that
financial markets received their worst threat. In order to keep the stock market
and the related index futures market functioning in an orderly fashion, brokers
needed to extend massive amounts of credit on behalf of their customers for their
margin calls. The magnitude of the problem is illustrated by the fact that just two
brokerage firms, Kidder, Peabody and Goldman, Sachs, had advanced $1.5 billion
in response to margin calls on their customers by noon of October 20. Clearly,
brokerage firms as well as specialists were severely in need of additional funds to
finance their activities. However, understandably enough, banks were growing
very nervous about the financial health of securities firms and so were reluctant
to lend to the securities industry at a time when it was most needed.
Upon learning of the plight of the securities industry, Alan Greenspan and
6Further evidence for this view is provided by Calomiris (1993).
7See the Wall Street Journal (1987) and Brimmer (1989) for a description of the events
surrounding the stock market crash.24
E. Gerald Corrigan, the president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the
Fed official most closely in touch with Wall Street, began to fear a breakdown in
the clearing and settlement systems and the collapse of securities firms. To
prevent this from occurring, Alan Greenspan announced before the market opened
on Tuesday, October 20, the Federal Reserve System's "readiness to serve as a
source of liquidity to support the economic and financial system." In addition to
this extraordinary announcement, the Fed encouraged key money center banks to
lend freely to their brokerage firm customers, and made it clear that it would
provide discount loans to banks so that they could make these loans. The banks
did as they were told and by October 21 had increased by $7.7 billion their loans
to brokers and to individuals to purchase or hold securities. As a result, the
markets kept functioning on Tuesday, October 20 and a market rally ensued that
day, raising the DJIA by over 100 points (over 5%).Thisaction by the Fed is
reminiscent of the actions taken by the Fed during the October 1929 panic period
in which it provided liquidity to enable money center banks to take over call loans
which had been called by others.
The potential for a serious financial crisis resulting from the stock market
crash is evident in the data on stock prices, interest rates and interest rate spreads
found in Figure 2 which again display patterns seen in other financial crises.
Panels A and B have the same format as those in Figure 1 with the date of the
stock market crash marked by a C, while an additional panel, Panel C, has been
added which contains weekly data on interest spread variables for the six months
surrounding the crash. Panel C plots an additional series, SPREADJ, the spread
between interest rates on junk bonds (those with ratings below Baa, obtained from
weekly issues of Barrons) and long-term Treasury bonds.
The commercial paper rate had been rising for a year before the stock
market crash because of the tight money policy followed by the Fed, while stock
prices began a decline over a month earlier. The evidence for increased
asymmetric information problems in credit markets before the crash, however, is
not particularly strong. The commercial paper-Treasury bill interest rate spread
variable, SPREADC, also had been rising for a year before the crash, and yet the
junk bond-Treasury and Baa-Treasury spread variables, SPREADJ and SPREADB,
did not rise until the stock market crash, when they immediately jumped. Not25
surprisingly,given that asymmetric information effects should impact more on low
quality borrowers than on high quality borrowers, the junk bond-Treasury spread
shows the largest jump. In the week of the stock market crash, it jumped by 130
basis points (1.3 percentage points) and rose another 60 basis points over the next
two weeks. However, as usually occurs after a panic, the junk bond-Treasury
spread fell quickly thereafter and within two months of the crash was back to pre
crash levels. The commercial paper-Treasury spread, SPREADC, followed a
similar pattern by returning quickly to its pre crash levels, but the Baa-Treasury
spread, SPREADB, declined more slowly and only reached its pre-crash level six
months after the crash.
The fact that the spread variables seem to fit a classic pattern for financial
crises suggests that the October 1987 stock market crash did have the potential to
create major asymmetric information problems in the credit markets. However,
the prompt action by the Fed kept the asymmetric information problem from
getting out of hand, as is indicated by the moderate increase in the Baa-Treasury
spread relative to earlier financial panics. The failure to enter a recession after the
stock market crash, despite many forecasters predictions along these lines, is
consistent with the view that the Fed's actions prevented the development of
serious asymmetric information problems in the credit markets. Furthermore, the
fact that the stock market crash in the United States occurred simultaneously with
stock market crashes in the rest of the world, suggests that a financial crisis, if it
had been allowed to develop, would have been a world-wide phenomenon and
would not have been restricted to the United States.
WHY HAS THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM BECOME
MOREFRAGILE?
The examples of the Penn Central bankruptcy and the October 1987 stock
market crash illustrates that the potential for financial crises is a real one. Here,
I want to argue that changes in the international financial system have made the
potential for financial crises even greater in recent years, thus requiring vigilance
and possible action by policymakers to prevent these crises.26
Increased Liquidity of International Financial Markets
The financial innovation process, which has led to such immense changes
in the international financial system in recent years, has to a large extent been
driven by the desire to increase the liquidity of financial markets. For example
contracts in the financial derivatives markets have been specifically designed to
improve liquidity. Stock index futures enable institutional investors to in effect
trade in large blocks of stock with extremely small transactions costs, as is also the
case for Treasury bond and other interest rate futures. Indeed, financial futures
markets are so liquid that the most successful options contracts, futures options,
are derivatives twice removed. Their underlying instrument is not debt or stock
securities, but instead is on the more liquid futures contracts on these debt and
stock securities.
Advances in computers and telecommunications have also made financial
markets more liquid throughout the world. Technology to transmit share prices
and information instantaneously around the world has led to dealers in New York,
London, or Tokyo not being constrained by the hours of organized exchanges; they
can trade at any time of day or night. The low cost of international communica-
tions is also making it easier to invest abroad, and we have moved to a world in
which stocks and bonds are traded internationally twenty-four hours a day. A
similar phenomenon has been occurring the futures markets, as is evidenced by the
development of the Globex electronic trading system by the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, which allows futures trading internationally even when exchanges are
not officially open.
The increase in liquidity produced by financial innovation is in general a
good thing because it makes the financial markets work more efficiently.
However, it does have the side effect that it may accelerate movements in financial
markets that could lead to financial crises. For example, many economists view
the speed at which the decline in stock prices occurred during the stock market
crash of October 1987 to be the result of increased liquidity provided by stock
index futures, which in effect, enabled institutional traders to sell large blocks of
shares more easily. As a result critics of stock index futures have advocated
restrictions on their trading, and stock exchanges, such as the NYSE, have placed27
limits on trading when there are large swings in stock prices within a day.
The advances in telecommunications have also resulted in increased global
integration of financial markets. The impact of advanced telecommunications on
the internationalization of financial markets was most dramatically illustrated by
the events during the Crash of 1987. Just before the crash on October 19, 1987,
there were substantial declines in foreign stock markets. As a result, there were
huge sell orders at the U.S. markets' openings on October 19 and stock prices on
the U.S. exchanges plummeted. Then the crash in U.S. stocks was transmitted to
foreign markets which experienced declines of similar magnitude. For better or for
worse, we now live in a world of highly integrated financial markets in which
disturbances in financial markets in one country will quickly be transmitted to
markets throughout the world.
The Increase in Corporate Indebtedness
An important development in the 1980s was the explosion of corporate indebted-
ness in the United States and the resulting increase in leverage. Corporate debt
relative to GDP which had been around the 30% level in the early 1980s, climbed
to above 40% by the late 1980s, and, although it has declined in recent years still
remains at quite high levels. Although there is some evidence that increased
corporate indebtedness has improved the incentives for managers and so has
improved the efficiency of American business,8 the asymmetric information
analysis of financial crises outlined here suggests that increased indebtedness has
the undesirable consequence that it makes financial crises more likely. Unantici-
pated disinflation will have a greater impact on adverse selection and moral hazard
problems in financial markets, the greater is business firms' indebtedness.
Furthermore, studies by Bernanke and Campbell (1988) and Bernanke, Campbell
and Whited (1990) indicate that a severe recession has the potential to trigger a
serious crisis of escalating bankruptcies.
'This evidence is however, highly controversial. See Michael Jensen (1988) and the rest o
the "Symposium on Takeovers" in which the Jensen paper is published.28
The evidence therefore suggests that increased corporate indebtedness has
made the American financial system more fragile. Although the explosion of
corporate indebtedness was primarily a U.S. phenomenon, instability in U.S.
financial markets would surely spread throughout the world given today's
integration of international financial markets.
The Decline of the Banking Industry
Financial innovation has caused banks to suffer declines in their cost
advantages in acquiring funds, that is, on the liabilities side of their balance sheet,
while at the same time, they have lost income advantages on the asset side of their
balance sheet. Fundamental forces in the financial system are thus causing a
simultaneous decline of cost and income advantages for banks that will cause the
banking industry to shrink in the future.
Banks have lost their cost advantages in acquiring funds because banks'
monopoly power over bank depositors, frequently granted by government
regulation, has been eroding. In 1960, over 60% of bank liabilities in the United
States were demand deposits which, by government regulation, paid no interest.
Attempts to get around deposit rate ceilings and reserve requirements (that in effect
acted as a tax on deposits since no interest is paid on reserves) led to financial
innovation which produced money market mutual funds. These helped break the
banks' monopoly power over depositors because depositors could now obtain
checking-like services while earning high interest rate on their money market
mutual fund accounts. A manifestation of these changes in the financial system
was the disintermediation process where banks were no longer able to attract
funds, particularly low cost funds: checkable deposits declined dramatically in
importance for banks, falling from over 60% of bank liabilities to under 20%
today, and many of these are NOW accounts which pay interest.
The loss of monopoly power over depositors has not just occurred in the
United States, but elsewhere as well. The financial deregulation process which has
been occurring world-wide has been openingup new attractive alternatives for
where depositors can put their funds. The financial deregulationprocess in Japan,29
for example, has opened a wide array of new financial instruments that are
available to the public, causing a similar disintermediation process to the one that
has already taken place in the United States.
The loss of cost advantages on the liabilities side of the balance-sheet for
is one reason that banks have become less competitive, but they have also been hit
by a decline in income advantages on the assets side. In the United States,
improvements in information technology have made it easier for business firms to
issue securities directly to the public. This has meant that instead of going to
banks to finance short-term credit needs, many of the banks' best business
customers now find it cheaper to go to the commercial paper market for funds
instead. The loss of this competitive advantage for American banks is evident in
the fact that before 1970 the amount of nonfinancial commercial paper was less
than 5%ofcommercial and industrial bank loans, while this ratio has grown to
over 20% today.
The rise of money market mutual funds has been another factor in the rapid
growth in the commercial paper market. Because money market mutual funds
need to hold liquid, high-quality, short-term assets such as commercial paper, the
growth of assets in these funds to over $500 billion has created a ready market in
commercial paper. This growth in the commercial paper market has allowed
finance companies, who primarily depend on commercial paper to acquire funds,
to greatly expand their operations at the expense of banks. Finance companies
who lend to many of the same businesses that borrow from banks have increased
their market share relative to banks: Before 1980, finance company loans to
business were around 30% of commercial and industrial loans, while currently
they are over 60%.
The rise of the junk bond market has also eaten into banks' loan business.
Improvements in information technology have made it easier for corporations to
sell their bonds to the public directly, thereby bypassing banks. Although Fortune
500 companies started taking this route in the 1970s, now lower quality corporate
borrowers are using banks less often because they have access to the junk bond
market.
Improvements in computer technology have led to securitization, in which
illiquid financial assets like bank loans or mortgages are transformed into30
marketable securities. Computers enable other financial institutions besides banks
to originate loans because they can now accurately evaluate creditrisk with
statistical methods, while computers have lowered transactions costs, making it
possible to bundle these loans and sell them as securities. As a result,banks no
longer have an advantage in making loans when default risk canbe easily
evaluated with computers. Without their former advantages, banks have lost loan
business to other financial institutions even though the banks themselves are
involved in the process of securitization. Securitization has been a particular
problem for mortgage-issuing institutions such as S&Ls because thebulk of
residential mortgages are now securitized.
Because of the squeeze on the banks resulting from the loss of competitive
advantages on both the cost side in raising funds and the income side on the use
of their funds, the last twenty years have not been good ones for the banking
industry. In the United States, commercial banks' importance as a source offunds
for borrowers has shrunk dramatically, from around 40% of total credit advanced
in the 1960s to below 30% in the early 1990s.9 Thrifts have also seen a decline
in market share from 20% in the 1960s and 70s to around 15% in the early 1990s.
Furthermore, bank profitability has declined as well. Two standard
measures of commercial bank profitability, the rate of return on assets and the rate
of return on equity indicate a declining trend in bank profits in the 1980s. For
example, the rate of return on equity has declined from 13% in the 1970-80 period
to 10% in the 1990-92 period.Although bank profits did improve sharply in
1992, many bank analysts believe that profits in that year were temporarily high
because of favorable interest rate developments that would not be long lasting.
The dismal performance of the banking industry has led to a large number of bank
failures in the United States, which have been running at rates more than ten times
that of the 1945-8 1 period, and to a shrinkage of the number of commercial banks
9See Boyd and Gertler (1993), Edwards (1993) and Mishkin (1995, forthcoming) for
additional discussion of the forces behind the decline in the banking industry. Note that as Boyd
and Gertler have pointed out, looking at the decline in the market share of credit advanced by
banks overstates somewhat the decline of the banking industry in credit markets because, as
pointed out in the previous chapter, banks have increased their off-balance sheet activities in
credit markets.31
from around 15,000 in the 1970s to 12,000 today.
The banking industry has not suffered as much in other countries as in the
United States because government regulators in these countries have often worked
harder to protect the privileged position of banks. However, as noted in the
introduction, banks in other countries have also begun to experience difficulties
recently. Because the forces driving the decline in the banking industry are so
fundamental, no matter how protected banks are in other countries eventually they
will have to face the music and cope with a more competitive environment. Thus
a major shrinkage of the banking industry will not be restricted to the United
States, but will occur throughout the industrialized world.
Normally economists do not lose much sleep over a declining industry.
Clearly the buggy whip industry could not survive after automobiles came onto the
scene, and the fact that it died a relatively quick death is a good thing because it
allowed resources to move to more productive uses. However, the decline of the
banking industry is another matter. The decrease of profitability means that less
capital will be attracted to the industry and banks would therefore have to shrink,
or would disappear entirely. If this is an orderly process, then there is no
problem. But the weakening profitability of banks means that bank failures are
more likely and, as we have seen, because depositors may not be able to
distinguish good banks from bad banks, bank failures have the potential to escalate
into bank panics. Then if a bank panic occurs, there will be a loss of information
production in financial markets, a resulting increase in adverse selection and moral
hazard problems, and therefore a sharp decline in investment and aggregate
economic activity. The fundamental forces which have been causing the banking
industry to shrink thus provide another reason for increased fragility of the
international financial system.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
By now, I hope that the reader is convinced that the potential for future
international financial crises is a real one and, has, if anything, grown in recent32
years. Now we can use the asymmetricinformation framework developed in this
lecture to discuss the issues facing policymakers on how to prevent international
financial crises.
Lender of Last Resort
The traditional recommendation for prevention of financial crises goes back
to Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873) who recommend that the central bank be
a lender of last resort who will lend freely during a panic at a penalty rate. What
does the asymmetric information framework outlined here say about this traditional
recommendation? Does it provide further guidance on when the central bank
needs to be ready to be a lender of last resort and how it can conduct this role?
How would the policy prescription differ from that provided by the earlier
literature on financial crises?
A monetarist view of financial disturbances sees them as important only
if they produce banking panics which leads to a decline in the money supply.
With this view, the lender of last resort role should be very a narrow one: the
central bank would only lend freely to banks when there is a sudden desire on the
part of depositors to withdraw their funds from banks. To lend freely at other
times, during what Anna Scwhartz (1986) calls "pseudo-financial crises", will only
lead to inefficiency because firms that deserve to fail are bailed out, or because it
results in excessive money growth that stimulates inflation. Indeed, the monetarist
position suggests that if the central bank is able to keep monetary aggregates
growing at appropriate rates, it is unlikely that a lender of last resort role is even
needed to promote the health of the economy.'0
The asymmetric information framework provides a better explanation of the
sequence of events during financial crises than does the monetarist view. An
asymmetric information view of financial crises, although it sees an important role
for bank panics, does not see them as the only financial disturbances that can have
'°For example, McCallum (1988) takestheposition that monetary policy only needs to
concern itself with adherence to a monetarist-like rule which adjusts monetary base growth for
past changes in velocity. In a more recent paper, McCallum (1989) suggeststhat pursuance of
such arule would have been enough to prevent the Great Depression.33
serious adverse effects on the aggregate economy. Financial crises have effects
over and above those resulting from banking panics, and analysis of such episodes
as the Penn Central Bankruptcy and the stock market crash in October 1987
suggest that a financial crisis which has serious adverse consequences for the
economy can develop even if there is no threat to the banking system.
Mishkin (1991) provides evidence that although there was no banking panic
in 1937 or 1938, a financial crisis seems to have occurred in the 1937-38 period.
From its peak in February 1937 until its trough in March 1938, the stock market
declined by 50%,withthe stock market return of -23.9% in March 1938 ranking
as the second worst monthly return in the 1834-1988 period. (Only the return of-
29.3 % in September 1931 is worse.) Coming at a time when the economy was
already in trouble, adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial
markets appeared to worsen substantially, with the spread between interest rates
on low and high quality bonds rising back to the extremely high levels found in
1934. This episode thus also suggests that a financial crisis situation can develop
even if a banking panic is not present.
The asymmetric information analysis thus suggests that a lender of last
resort role may be necessary to provide liquidity to nonbanking sectors of the
financial system in which asymmetric information problems have developed.
Furthermore, it suggests that financial disturbances outside of the banking system
in the postwar period have had the potential to have serious adverse effects on the
aggregate economy and that these adverse consequences have in fact been
prevented only by quick actions of the Federal Reserve to pursue an expanded role
as a lender of last resort. However, it also provides support for the monetarist
position that in order to prevent severe disturbances to the economy, it is important
for the central bank to operate as the lender of last resort to prevent banking
panics.
Although a central bank's role as a lender of last resort has the benefit of
preventing financial crises, it does have a cost. If a bank's depositors expect that
the central bank will provide a bank with discount loans when it gets into trouble
and come to its rescue, then they have less incentive to monitor the bank and
withdraw their deposits if the bank takes on too much risk. Thus the lender of last
resort role in itself can produce a moral hazard problem because it can lead to34
expectations which encourage banks to take on too much risk. This moral hazard
problem is most severe for large banks if they are the beneficiaries of a somewhat
misnamed "too big to fail" policy in which depositors at a large bank in trouble
are protected from any losses by a lender of last resort policy, such as that used
when Continental Illinois failed in 1984 in the United States. (The "too big to
fail" policy is somewhat misnamed because although depositors are completely
protected from losses, the bank is in fact allowed to fail with losses to the equity
holders.) Evidence in Boyd and Gertler (1993) suggests that the cost of the "too
big to fail" policy has indeed been quite high in the United States after it was put
into force with the failure of Continental Illinois in 1984.
Similarly, the lender of last resort role to prevent a financial crisis arising
outside of the banking sector may encourage other financial institutions and
borrowers from them to take on too much risk. Knowing that the central bank
will prevent a financial crisis if it appears imminent will encourage them to protect
themselves less against systemic risks, i.e., those that occur system-wide which
will trigger a lender of last resort response. There is thus a tradeoff between the
moral hazard cost of the lender of last resort role and its benefits in preventing
financial crises.
The asymmetric information view of financial crises thus, like the
monetarist view, does see a danger in too liberal a use of the lender of last
activities on the part of central banks. Although the asymmetric information view
has a broader definition of what constitutes a financial crisis than the monetarist
view, it also does not recommend that a central bank be a lender of last resort
during a pseudo-crisis. As we have seen, a stock market crash by itself, as in
May 1940 in the U.S., does not imply that a financial crisis is imminent. Neither
does a foreign exchange crisis or a collapse in other asset values, such as real
estate. The asymmetric information framework outlined here does provide clues,
however, as to when a lender of last resort role is necessary. A sharp decline in
the stock market, when it is accompanied by a sharp rise in the demand for
liquidity may signal an imminent financial crisis, as would a failure of a major
financial or nonfinancial institution when there already is some evidence of
asymmetric information problems financial markets as reflected by an increase in
the interest rate spread between low and high quality borrowers.35
However,an increase in the interest rate spread by itself does not imply
that a central bank should act as a lender of last resort because a natural outcome
duringa recessionis a rise in uncertainty about who will be bad rather than good
credit risks and thusarise in the interest rate spread. Indeed, the increase in
asymmetric information problems in financial markets during a recession is a
potential propagation mechanism that explains why recessions are prolonged.
Although lender of last resort activities which increase liquidity to reduce
asymmetric information problems during recessions have benefits, we have also
seen that they create moral hazard costs as well. Thus, the need to use the lender
of last resort role sparingly in order to keep moral hazard from getting out of hand
argues against such intervention unless it is absolutely necessary. The lender of
last resort role should therefore occur very infrequently.
One problem with deciding to engage in the lender of last resort role is that
for it to be effective it has to be implemented quickly. Less intervention is
required the faster the lender of last resort role is implemented because once
market participants know that liquidity is being injected into the system,
uncertainty in the financial markets will decrease. Thus, the Federal Reserve's
actions during the stock market crash of 1987 are a textbook case of how a lender
of last resort role can be performed successfully. The Fed's action was
immediate, with an announcement that operated to decrease uncertainty in the
marketplace. Reserves were injected into the system, but once the crisis was over,
they were withdrawn. Not only was a financial crisis averted, but also the
inflationary consequences of this exercise of the lender of last resort role were
quite small.
However, the need for the lender of last resort action to be quick does mean
that central banks may not be able to wait until all the information is in that tells
them a financial crisis is about to occur or is occurring. To wait too long to
implement a lender of last resort policy could be disastrous. Thus, even though
the asymmetric information view of financial crises provides some guidance as to
when a lender of last resort role should be implemented, deciding on when to do
so will necessarily be an art rather than a science. Central bank "feel" for
conditions in financial markets that comes from informal as well as formal signals
about developments in these markets is necessary to make the appropriate decision36
on when a lender of last resort role is necessary.
Discount Lending
A corollary of the monetarist view is that the operation of central bank
discount facilities may be unnecessary. Open market operations aresufficient to
keep the money supply on its target path and this is all thatis needed to keep the
economy functioning well. Using this reasoning,Friedman (1958) advocated
abolishment of the Federal Reserve's discounting operation and more recently
Goodfriend and King (1988) seem to come to a similar conclusion. Goodfriend
and King (1988) dichotomize the activities of the central bank into "monetary
policy", i.e., changes in the total volume of high powered moneywhich can be
entirely carried out with open market operations, and "banking policy",which
involves regular lending and emergency financial assistance to individual banks and
institutions along with regulatory and supervisory actions. Because they see
financial crises as being essentially monetary in nature, they do not see the need
for "banking policy" and discount lending. Since they consider the regulatory and
supervisory activities that become necessary when there is discount lending bythe
central bank to be costly, they lean to elimination of Federal Reserve discount
lending)'
The asymmetric information interpretation of financial crises, on the other
hand, provides a strong rationale for the operation of the central bank discount
facilities. As the analysis of the response to the stock market crashes of 1929 and
1987 indicate, a central bank can use the discount facilities to channel liquidity
directly to the sector that is most in need of it. Without discount facilities, a
central bank can only provide liquidity to a specific sector by providing it to the
overall economy using open market operations. Because this provision of liquidity
might be very indirect, a larger infusion of liquidity may be needed to preventthe
'They do hedge their position, however, for they "wonder whether discount lendingcould
be rationalized under a different criterion: to prevent the disruption costs of widespread
insolvencies associated with temporary interest rate spikes." (Goodfriend and King (1988) p. 18.)
The argument in this paper that disruption costs may indeed be high from widespread insolvencies
provides a rationale for "banking policy" even in their framework.37
financial disturbance from creating severe asymmetric information problems.
Consequently, in order for a central bank to achieve its objectives it may have to
put so much liquidity into the economy that it would produce substantial
inflationary pressure. Having discounting at its disposal provides the central bank
with a delicate tool that enables it to cope with financial disturbances without
promoting inflationary tendencies.
The operation of discount facilities also provides a central bank with another
major advantage in dealing with potential financial crises. Government bailouts
of individual firms have the significant disadvantage that it is likely to keep
inefficient firms in operation and also encourages excessive risk taking on the part
of firms that expect to be bailed out. In essence, the problem is again one of
asymmetric information because the government is unlikely to be able to separate
out insolvent from temporarily illiquid firms. In addition, political pressures may
influence bailout decisions to the detriment of economic efficiency.'2
On the other hand, discount lending enables the central bank to encourage
Lending to a sector of the financial system in which asymmetric information has
become a serious problem and yet minimizes some of the efficiency losses from
this lending. Using discounting enables the central bank to take advantage of the
monitoring and information collection expertise inherent in individual banks so that
lending is likely to be made only to solvent business enterprises. In other words,
the central bank is maldng use of the banks as delegated monitors on its behalf.
In order to do this the central bank must give the appropriate incentives to banks
to engage in monitoring and information collection the banks must be responsible
for the credit risk involved in lending. The central bank needs to indicate that it
will provide liquidity to prevent systemic risk, but would not be responsible for
idiosyncratic risk. This is exactly what the Federal Reserve did when it made
discount loans to banks during the Penn Central bankruptcy crisis so that banks
could in turn lend to borrowers in the commercial paper market and also when the
Fed lent to banks during the stock market crash of 1987 so that the banks would
The cost of politically motivated propping up of insolvent firms is amply demonstrated by
what occurred during the 1980s when political forces led to the government allowing insolvent
Savings and Loans to stay in business, the result of which was losses to the American taxpayer
in excess of $100 billion.38
extend additional loans to their brokerage firm customers. It was made clear that
these customers would have to be considered creditworthy by the banks. The
burden of screening out good from bad borrowers was thus left to individual
banks, who have the expertise to do this properly.'3
The use of banks as delegated monitors for the central bank during a
financial crisis suggests that the traditional recommendation that the central bank
should lend at a penalty rate when it performs its lender of last resort role might
be problematic. In order to provide banks with the incentives to act as the central
bank's delegated monitor, banks must be able to profit from this activity. Thus
there is a case for subsidizing banks by setting the discount rate below the interest
rate they earn on their loans during a financial crisis. Without this subsidy, the
banks might not be willing to make the necessary loans. The need for delegated
monitors during a financial crisis might thus explain why central banks typically
set their discount rate below market interest rates, which requires them to ration
discount lending. Although monetary economists have typically criticized central
banks for setting the discount rate too low and engaging in rationing of discount
loans, there is a partial rationale for this policy. However, it is not clear why
central banks would not obtain the full benefits from banks acting as delegated
monitors by setting the discount rate below market rates only during a financial
crisis and not in more normal times.
The asymmetric information analysis of financial crises also provides a
"Fhe discussion above illustrates why I think that the following statement by Goodfriend and
King (1988) is misguided. On page 18 immediately following the quote in footnote 5theystate,
"If such aggregate disruption cost were large enough, temporary transfers to the banking system
that could avoid such costs might be in society's interest. It should be pointed out, however, that
a similar argument could be made for avoiding disruption costs of temporary insolvencies
anywhere in the economy. Therefore, acceptance of the criterion for banking policy alone would
need to be based on a demonstration that disruption costs are much larger in the banking sector
than elsewhere.I disagree particularly with the last sentence. Use of the discount window
(banking policy) is especially valuable if disruption costs are larger in the nonbanking sector than
in the banking sector. Use of discounting to lend to banks who, in turn, lend to the sector in
financial difficulty minimizes the adverse selection problem facing a central bank lending directly
to that sector because it delegates information collection and monitoring to individual banks who
have incentives to do this effectively. Thus discounting helps the central bank to deal with
systemic risks and not idiosyncratic risks. Bernanke and Gertler (1990) also point out that
advantages of using financial intermediaries who have information capital to make loans to a
troubled sector of the economy.39
rationale for discount lending to banks in order to prevent banking panics.
Clearly, it provides support for the view that during a financial crisis central banks
should lend to illiquid but solvent banks. Lending to insolvent banks, however,
creates the moral hazard problem that arises with the "too big to fail" policy: it
creates incentives for banks to take on too much risk. The problem facing central
banks is that they are unable to use delegated monitors to channel funds to illiquid
but solvent banks. Rather they have to make the decision themselves as to
whether a bank in trouble deserves to receive an infusion of liquidity. This raises
two problems in turn. First, central banks must have sufficient information about
banks they may need to lend to in order for them to be able to tell whether a bank
needing liquidity is solvent or insolvent. Second, central banks may not have the
right incentives to lend to illiquid but insolvent banks rather than insolvent banks.
In contrast to private banks, who are subject to a profit motive and thus have the
appropriate incentive to lend only to solvent firms, central banks may be
influenced by other considerations. They may be too anxious to protect the banks
that they are close to and also may be put under intense political pressure to bail
out insolvent banks. Indeed, in the United States the Federal Reserve has been
accused of causing higher losses to the American taxpayer by propping up
insolvent banks through its discount lending, thus allowing them to continue in
operation which then resulted in higher losses to the FDIC. As a result, there are
provisions in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
to limit Federal Reserve discounting to insolvent banks.
The asymmetric information framework outlined in this lecture does provide
a rationale for a "too big to fail" policy in which a central bank lends to a big,
insolvent bank because a failure of a big bank can create uncertainty in the
financial markets that make a financial crisis more likely. Because I took the view
that the failure of a large bank could have extremely adverse consequences for the
economy, in previous writings, Mishkin (1992), I advocated some discretionary
use of the "too big to fail" policy. However, research such as Boyd and Gertler
(1993) have convinced me that the costs of the "too big to fail" policy may be
higher than I originally thought. In addition, further thinking about the Penn
Central and the stock market crash of 1987 episodes has led me to realize that
there is an alternative way for a central bank to keep a financial crisis from40
developing when a large bank becomes insolvent. As in the Penn Central case,
the insolvent institution can be allowed to fail with consequent losses to both the
equity holders and the debt holders, which in the case of a bank, would include
the depositors uninsured by government deposit insurance. However, once the
central bank made the decision to let the insolvent bank go under, it would need
to make an announcement of its "readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to
support the economic and financial system", as on October 20, 1987, and would
make it clear that the discount window would be open to banks that needed
liquidity. The result is that the large bank would be allowed to fail and produce
losses for equityholders and debtholders, such as uninsured depositors, thus
creating incentives for these parties to keep large banks from taking on too much
risk. However, the lender of last resort role of the central bank would then keep
a bank panic from spreading to the rest of the banking system, thereby preventing
a financial crisis.
Regulation
The discussion of discount lending above indicates that central bank lending
to financial institutions can create moral hazard incentives for them to take on too
much risk. To prevent this, the central bank needs to restrict its lending to solvent
institutions that are not taking on too much risk. Just as private financial
institutions need to have access to information about borrowers so that they can
screen and monitor them to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems,
it is also desirable for a central bank to have similar access to information about
the financial institutions it lends to. One way for central banks to have this
information is for it to have a direct regulatory oversight over these financial
institutions, as occurs in the United States where the Federal Reserve conducts
periodic examinations of banks. This is one reason why the U.S. Treasury's
recommendation in 1991 to take away the Federal Reserve's supervisory role over
large national banks that it has through supervision of their bank holding
companies was ill founded.'4 Some central banks, such as the Bundesbank,
'4See Mishkin (1992)41
strenuously object to having a direct regulatory role because they believe that it
will subject them to political pressures which may interfere with their ability to use
monetary policy to combat inflation. Nonetheless, if a central bank is to run its
discount operations to minimize moral hazard problems it needs to make sure that
it has mechanisms in place that provide it with the required amount of information
about its borrowers. Thus even if a central bank does not have a direct regulatory
role over the institutions it lends to, it must be a de facto regulator in that it
examines the state of these institutions and can deny them discount loans if it
believes they are taking on too much risk.
An additional implication of the analysis here is that once a financial
institution is given access to the discount facilities of a central bank, the central
bank must have access to information on the institution's risk-taking activities.
This implication is important because central banks are often required toopen their
discount facilities to financial institutions other than banks. If these institutionsare
to receive discount privileges, they must bear the cost of being subjected to some
regulatory oversight by the central bank.
Our earlier discussion of the decline of the banking industrysuggests that
regulation has another important role in preventing financial crises: it needs to
promote the orderly decline of the industry. One of the reasons that the decline
of the banking industry was so precipitous in the 1980s in the United States is that
the regulatory system encouraged risk-taking on thepart of banks. Federal deposit
insurance, especially combined with the "too big to fail" policy, protected all
depositors, including large ones, from any losses when banks failed and so their
was little incentives for depositors to monitor banks and withdraw funds if the
bank was taking on too much risk.This lack of monitoring by depositors
combined with lax regulation by American regulators meant that, when faced with
declining profitability, the banks took on even more risk to shoreup. their profits.
For a while, the subsidy to risk-taking created by deposit insurancekept the
banking industry from shrinldng, but when many of the banks risky bets did not
pay off, bank failures resulted. The outcome was then a much sharper drop in the
size of the industry than would have occurred otherwise.Although a financial
crisis was avoided in the U.S. through actions of the Federal Reserve and the
deposit insurance agencies, the cost to the American taxpayer has been high, with42
losses to the deposit insurance agencies exceeding $100 billion.
The reason why the American experience is important to policymakers in
other countries is that the decline in the banking industry in these countries has not
yet progressed as far as it has in the U.S. The decline in the banking industryin
these countries thus does have the potential to increase the probability of a
financial crisis if it is not managed well. The lesson from the United States, is
that bank regulation must not promote risk-taking in an environment where
fundamental forces are decreasing the profitability of the industry. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 has reduced some of the
moral hazard incentives in U.S. bank regulation, although more needs to be
done.'5 Policymakers in other countries need to examine their bank regulatory
system to ensure that they too do not encourage excessive risk-taking, making a
precipitous decline in their banking industries more likely and thereby increasing
the potential for financial crises.
International Policy Coordination
International policy coordination to manage aggregate economic activity has
frequently been criticized in the literature and has given international policy
coordination a bad name. However, the analysis in this lecture indicates that
international policy coordination to deal with financial crises is imperative. The
increased integration of financial markets throughout the industrialized world
means that financial market disturbances in one country will be transferred quickly
to other countries. Given the linkages between financial institutions in different
countries, a failure of a major institution in one country will create uncertainty in
financial markets throughout the world. In addition, as we saw in October 1987,
a stock market crash in one country may result in a stock market crash in other
countries as well. As the Europeans have learned recently, high interest rates in
one country, such as Germany, lead to pressures for high interest rates in other
countries, particularly if they are trying to fix their exchange rates. Thus financial
'5Mishkin (1995, forthcoming) contains a discussion of this legislation and what additional
measures can help reduce the moral hazard incentives for too much risk taking.43
crises, if they are to occur, are likely to be more of a global phenomenon than
they were in the past.
As we have seen, central banks can use their lender of last resort role to
prevent financial crises, but in the face of a financial crisis that is world wide,
cooperation between central banks could be essential. If a failure of a major
financial institution is imminent in one country, not only must the central bank in
that country know about it and be ready toengage in a lender of last resort role
to make sure that the failure doesn't spread to the rest of the financialsystem in
that country, but it must inform other central banks about the imminent failure and
they too must stand ready to perform the lender of last resort role. In addition,
if a central bank does not feel that it has the resources to containa financial crisis
in its country, then it needs to be able to solicit the help of other central banksto
keep the financial crisis from getting out of hand and spreading to other countries.
Highly integrated global financial markets also requires cooperation between
countries on banking regulation. Excessive risk-taking by banks needsto be
restricted everywhere, since a banking panic in onecountry could spread to
another. Furthermore, banks must not be able toescape regulatory oversight as
a result of their international banking activities. As the 1991 collapse of BCCI
indicated, closer cooperation among bank regulatory authorities and standardization
of regulatory requirements isnecessary in order to make sure that all banks are
properly regulated. The world has been moving in this direction through
agreements like the Basle accord on capital requirements in 1988 and the new
regulatory oversight procedures announced by the Basle Committee in July 1992
to further standardize the regulation of international banks.
CONCLUSION
The view of financial crises outlined in this lecturesuggests that the
international financial system is more fragile than it has been in thepast and so
policymakers must be especially vigilant for potential financial crises. The
asymmetric information framework developed here provides some guidance for
how policymakers can deal with potential financial crises, but it alsosuggests that44
there are elements or art as well as science to coping with financial crises.
Furthermore, with the increased global integration of financial markets, the need
for international policy coordination between central bankers to prevent financial
crises is critical.45
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